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Abstract
We provide a logical matrix semantics and a Gentzen-style sequent
calculus for the first-degree entailments valid in W. T. Parry’s logic of
Analytic Implication. We achieve the former by introducing a logical
matrix closely related to that inducing paracomplete weak Kleene logic,
and the latter by presenting a calculus where the initial sequents and the
left and right rules for negation are subject to linguistic constraints.
1. Background and Aim
The logic of Analytic Implication was developed during the early 1930s by W.
T. Parry, at the time a doctoral student in Philosophy at Harvard University,
under the supervision of A. N. Whitehead.1 His system was one of the early
respondents to the so-called paradoxes of strict implication, exhibited by the
logics developed by C. I. Lewis.2 A few decades later, the term relevance logics
would be coined to refer to those systems lacking the aforementioned paradoxes
as reported, e.g., in the very first paragraphs of [29]. In this vein, because
these alleged paradoxes do not hold of the notion of implication characteristic
of Parry’s logic (henceforth, PAI), it is appropriate to classify his system as a
relevance logic avant la lettre.
The main and distinctive feature of PAI (and of the many systems of an-
alytic implication belonging to its ilk) is the rejection of the classically valid
principle of Addition, sometimes also referred to as Disjunction Introduction.
In other words, the principle leading from a formula ϕ to a disjunction of the
form ϕ ∨ ψ, where ψ is an arbitrary formula. Parry blamed on this principle
the derivability of the paradoxes of strict implication—given that it is famously
featured in Lewis’ derivation of an arbitrary formula ψ from a contradiction of
the form ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ. His rejection of Addition was not due to a particular fixation
with that principle, but rather a consequence of a more general diagnosis. Parry
1The main publications which featured presentations of this system were his Doctoral
Thesis [34], and his articles [35], [36], [37], [38], and the posthumously published [39].
2These paradoxes pertain to the fact that, on the one hand, necessarily true propositions
(e.g., logical truths) are implied by any proposition whatsoever and, on the other hand,
necessarily false propositions (e.g., logical contradictions) imply any proposition whatsoever.
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thought that genuine entailments should be subject to a substantive constraint,
christened by him the “Proscriptive Principle”. In the literature, it is com-
monly accepted that when working with a propositional language and focusing
on an implication of the form ϕ → ψ this constraint translates into requiring
the inclusion of the set of propositional variables appearing in ψ in the set of
propositional variables appearing in ϕ—as extensively discussed, e.g., in [20]. In
other words, where V ar(χ) refers to the set of propositional variables appear-
ing in a formula χ, that an implication of the form ϕ → ψ complains with the
Proscriptive Principle amounts to:
V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ)
Following the usual terminology, let us denote by “first-degree entailments”
those entailments of the form ϕ→ ψ where ϕ and ψ do not contain occurrences
of the implication connective. Thus, as proved by K. Fine in [21], F. Johnson
in [27], and later by others (e.g., in [31] and [20]) the first-degree fragment of
Parry’s PAI can be characterized in terms of the set of inferences that are valid in
Classical Logic (CL, hereafter) that respect the Proscriptive Principle—thereby
corroborating a hypothesis discussed by Go¨del in [25]. That is to say, when
ϕ→ ψ is a first-degree entailment:
`PAI ϕ→ ψ ⇐⇒
{
ϕ `CL ψ, and
V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ)
Our aim in this article is to develop a simple semantics and a simple sequent
calculus for those first-degree entailments valid in Parry’s system. To accomplish
these tasks, it will be easier to consider such a set of first-degree entailments
as a logical system in its own right. This can be easily done by considering
the “first-degree fragment” Lfde of a logic L formulated in a language with an
implication connective →, along the following lines, where ϕ → ψ is a first-
degree entailment:
`L ϕ→ ψ ⇐⇒ ϕ `Lfde ψ
Thus, it will make things clearer in what follows to notice that we will be
providing a semantics and a calculus for the first-degree entailment fragment
of PAI, that is to say, for the logic PAIfde. In this respect, then, our aims here
are twofold. Our first goal is to develop a simple matrix semantics for PAIfde,
following the standard techniques of Abstract Algebraic Logic discussed, e.g.,
in [23]. Our second goal is to develop a simple sequent calculus for PAIfde,
following the techniques applied to obtain linguistically constrained sequent
calculi presented, e.g., in [11], [12], [14], [24], and [45].
To this extent, the article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide
a single logical matrix for PAIfde, building on previous work with so-called in-
fectious logics and paraconsistent subsystems of 3-valued weak Kleene logic. In
Section 3 we analyze further aspects of the semantics, establishing its connec-
tions with certain structures called P lonka sums, and proving its potential to be
2
generalized in order to interpret other systems respecting Parry’s Proscriptive
Principle. In Section 4 we provide a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for PAIfde,
taking a great deal of inspiration from work in calculi of this sort for infectious
logics and for subsystems of PAI, like Angell’s logic of Analytic Containment. In
Section 5 we analyze some further aspects of the calculus, related to its so-called
external consequence relation, and also to the potential to generalize its features
so as to provide calculi for other logics satisfying the Proscriptive Principle. In
Section 6 we finish up with some concluding remarks and directions of future
work.
This being said, before delving into the proper contents of the article, let us
briefly make explicit that we will be working with a propositional language L
counting with a denumerable set V ar of propositional variables p, q, r, . . . and
with logical connectives ¬,∧,∨—intended to represent negation, conjunction
and disjunction, respectively. Thus, FOR(L) will be the algebra of well-formed
formulae, standardly defined, whose carrier set is the set of well-formed formulae
FOR(L). In this respect, lower case Greek letters ϕ,ψ, χ, . . . will be considered
as schematic formulae, whereas upper case Greek letters Γ,∆,Θ, . . . will be
considered as schematic sets of formulae.
2. A simple logical matrix for Parry’s logic
In this section, our goal is to provide matrix semantics for PAIfde, that is to say,
the first-degree entailment fragment of Parry’s logic of Analytic Implication.
In this respect, it should be duly noted that semantics for Parry’s full system
have been previously given by K. Fine in [21], in the vein of Kripke frames with
a subject-matter assignment function—thus employing intensional semantics.
With respect to the first-degree fragment of PAI, extensional semantics have
been given by T. Smiley in [43] and F. Paoli in [31], in the form of algebraic
semantics—particularly, semantics where logical consequence is defined in terms
of certain order-theoretic relations holding between the elements of the carrier
set of a given algebra as, e.g., in L. Humberstone’s [26, p. 246].
In what follows, we will endow PAIfde with extensional semantics of a differ-
ent and more common kind, that of the so-called logical matrices—extensively
studied in the literature on Abstract Algebraic Logic, e.g., in [23]. In a nutshell,
matrix semantics are given by a set of truth-values and an associated set of
truth-tables describing the operations these values partake on, and the results
thereof. Logical consequence is then defined as necessary preservation from
premises to conclusion, of a certain subset of truth-values, called designated
values. Whence, if the premise is designated, so must the conclusion.
More formally, for a given propositional language L a logical L-matrixM is
a pair 〈A, D〉, where A is an algebra of the same similarity type than L, and D
is a subset of A, the universe or carrier set of A. Letting anM-valuation v be an
homomorphism from FOR(L) to A, a logical matrixM induces a consequence
relation M in the following, standard manner, where Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FOR(L):
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Γ M ϕ⇐⇒ for every M-valuation v: if v(Γ) ⊆ D, then v(ϕ) ∈ D
Hereafter, when the consequence relation that is characteristic of a logic L
is induced by a single matrix M, we will take the liberty of referring to M
as L. For example, let B be the 2-element Boolean Algebra whose carrier set
is {t, f}, and whose operations are depicted by the usual 2-valued truth-tables.
Thus, 〈B, {t}〉 is the usual logical matrix associated with CL, inducing the well-
known consequence relation of Classical Logic—which, in what follows, we will
interchangeably refer to as `CL and CL. In the rest of this section, we examine
one way of arriving at a simple matrix semantics for PAIfde, that is to say, at a
logical matrix that will properly induce the target logic.
As remarked before and as noted elsewhere—e.g., by T. Ferguson in [18]—
the satisfaction of the Proscriptive Principle by a consequence relation or a logic
has as an immediate consequence the failure of the inference schema commonly
referred to as Addition, that is, of the inference schema whose premise is ϕ and
whose conclusion is ϕ ∨ ψ. Thus, in the quest for appropriate matrix seman-
tics for PAIfde we may naturally look for logical matrices inducing consequence
relations where Addition, as an inference schema, turns out to be invalid. The
(paracomplete) weak Kleene logic Kw3 —also referred sometimes as the classical,
internal, or {¬,∧,∨}-fragment of D. Bochvar’s logic of nonsense from [3]—is
famously well-known for being a system of this sort. This logic can be seen as
induced by a single logical matrix built using the 3-element weak Kleene alge-
bra, whose carrier set is {t, e, f} and whose operations ¬,∧,∨ can be depicted
by the following “truth-tables”:
¬
t f
e e
f t
∧ t e f
t t e f
e e e e
f f e f
∨ t e f
t t e t
e e e e
f t e f
Definition 2.1. Kw3 is the logic induced by the logical matrix 〈WK, {t}〉
As such, it is easily observed that Addition is invalid in Kw3 , i.e., ϕ 2Kw3 ϕ∨ψ.
Just let ϕ be p and let ψ be q. Consider a weak Kleene valuation v such that
v(p) = t and v(q) = e. In such a valuation v(p∨q) = e. But then the premise is
designated and the conclusion is not, whence the inference in question is invalid
and, therefore, the schema is invalid too.
Thus, Kw3 being a subclassical system that invalidates Addition may lead
one to wonder whether or not it coincides with PAIfde. It is straightforward to
observe that it is not. This can be easily shown by noticing that said weak Kleene
logic does not satisfy the Proscriptive Principle. To wit, Kw3 does not satisfy
this principle because, among others, the inference schema usually referred to
as Explosion is valid in it. In other words, that ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ Kw3 ψ. However, in
what pertains to this inference schema it might well happen that V ar(ψ) *
V ar(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ). Whence, Kw3 does not satisfy the Proscriptive Principle.
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Indeed, a more general fact concerning this 3-valued logic and the non-
satisfaction of said principle holds. Let a formula ϕ be an anti-theorem if and
only if ϕ entails every formula χ. As shown by A. Urquhart in [48], and de-
tailed by us down below, the presence of anti-theorems is the only thing that
differentiates Kw3 from our target logic, PAIfde.
Observation 2.2 ([48]). For all ϕ,ψ ∈ FOR(L) :
ϕ Kw3 ψ ⇐⇒
{
ϕ CL ψ and V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), or
ϕ CL χ for all χ ∈ FOR(L)
Interestingly, this already points towards a way of satisfying the Proscriptive
Principle in the context of certain subsystems of weak Kleene logic—as high-
lighted in [18]. To understand such a link, it is informative to observe that Kw3
belongs to a broader collection of so-called infectious logics, that have been the
focus of a growing collection of recent works.3 Intuitively, infectious logics can
be seen as induced by logical matrices whose underlying algebras count with
a contaminating, absorptive or—in the words of N. Rescher in [41, p. 29]—
“infectious” element. That is to say, an element which is the output of every
operation that it is an input of. We can give a more formal understanding of
these ideas, as follows.
Definition 2.3. An algebra A has an infectious element u if and only if for
every n-ary operation ¶ of A, and every {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A:
if u ∈ {a1, . . . , an}, then ¶A(a1, . . . , an) = u
More formally, then, a logical matrixM = 〈A, D〉 has an infectious truth-value
if and only if A has an infectious element. Furthermore, if a logic L is induced
by a single logical matrix M which has an infectious value, then we may say
that L is an infectious logic. With these definitions in mind, the following result
due to T. Ferguson, linking infectious sublogics of Kw3 and systems satisfying
the Proscriptive Principle can now be understood.
Observation 2.4 ([18]). Let L be a logic induced by the single matrix M =
〈A, D〉 such that (i) A has an infectious element u, (ii) u /∈ D, and (iii) L has
no anti-theorems. Then, L satisfies the Proscriptive Principle.
Thus, in terms of contemporary literature, one way to arrive at logics satis-
fying Parry’s principle is to look at paraconsistent infectious subsystems of weak
Kleene logic.
This result is of great significance in the quest for appropriate semantics for
the first-degree entailment fragment of Parry’s logic of Analytic Implication,
as it certainly suggests a plausible path that will lead us to our goal. We
will not claim that said path is the only, the best, or even the most efficient
3The collection of recent works focused on these systems is growing by the hour, but just
to name a few outside of those already cited elsewhere in this article: [6], [7], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [13], [15], [17], [18], [19], [30], [33], [44], [45], [46], among many others.
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way to arrive at such semantics, but only that it is the one suggested by the
previous discussion.4 In a few words, the idea would be to exploit the fact
that anti-theorems are the only thing coming in between weak Kleene logic and
PAIfde, by expanding the matrix inducing K
w
3 with an additional truth-value,
whose presence would prevent there being anti-theorems at all—without thereby
having any other logical costs.
Special care should be put in exploring this alternative, though. Paracon-
sistent infectious sublogics of Kw3 have been studied in the literature that do,
indeed, satisfy the Proscriptive Principle. However, all of them fail to pin down
exactly the set of first-degree entailments that are valid in PAI. For instance, G.
Priest’s system Sfde discussed in [40] is a logic of this sort which, nevertheless,
invalidates certain inferences that are valid in our target system PAIfde—prime
among them Disjunctive Syllogism which, if the material conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ is
defined as ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, amounts to Modus Ponens.
Therefore, if we intend to conceive PAIfde as a paraconsistent infectious
sublogic of Kw3 , the logical matrix inducing it would need to diverge as little
and as seamlessly as possible from that inducing weak Kleene logic. In fact, if
such a matrix would count with an additional truth-value, its inclusion should
have the effect of making all formulae satisfiable—thereby precluding the exis-
tence of anti-theorems—without any other problematic logical side-effect.
Below we show that this strategy can be happily carried out, with the help
of a logical matrix built using a 4-element algebra found first (to the best of
our knowledge) in F. Paoli’s work [31].5 The algebra in question will be, for
obvious reasons, referred to us as the FP algebra. It’s carrier set is {t,o, e, f}
and its operations ¬,∧,∨ can be, as usual, described using the “truth-tables”
appearing below:
¬
t f
o o
e e
f t
∧ t o e f
t t e e f
o e o e e
e e e e e
f f e e f
∨ t o e f
t t e e t
o e o e e
e e e e e
f t e e f
For the purpose of showing that this algebra can be the basis of a logical
matrix that will characterize PAIfde, we provide the following definition of a
logic we will provisionally call CL[eo], later proving that its formula-to-formula
4To wit, there are other “purely semantic” ways of characterizing PAIfde by appealing, in
a broader sense, to logical matrices. Just to name one, consider the intersection of CL and
the logic characterized by—using the terminology of E. Chemla, P. E´gre´ and B. Spector in
[8]—the “definedness” consequence relation over the WK algebra, induced by focusing on
the single matrix 〈WK, {t, f}〉. The latter consequence relation is such that ϕ entails ψ if
and only if V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), whence the characterization already mentioned. Whether it is
possible to obtain a single logical matrix out of the 2-valued semantics for CL and the 3-valued
semantics for this logic—in the same vein in which K. Fine obtains a 16-valued logical matrix
for Angell’s ACfde out of two 4-valued matrices in [22]—is an open question for us.
5It should be mentioned that F. Paoli employs this algebra to provide algebraic semantics,
not matrix semantics, for the first-degree entailment fragment of R. Epstein’s Relatedness
logic from [16].
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valid inferences are identical to those first-degree entailments that are valid in
PAI. In other words, borrowing the terminology of L. Humberstone’s [26], that
the Fmla-Fmla fragment of CL[eo] = PAIfde.
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Definition 2.5. CL[eo] is the logic induced by the logical matrix 〈FP, {t,o}〉
Before we get into the proof that CL[eo] characterizes the first-degree en-
tailments valid in PAI, let us note not only that it is a paraconsistent infectious
sublogic of Kw3 , but also that its underlying logical matrix conforms to the re-
quirements outlined above. First, that it is a paraconsistent logic can be noticed
by observing that all classically-unsatisfiable formulae ϕ are satisfiable in CL[eo],
simply by considering the valuation v such that v(p) = o, for all p ∈ V ar(ϕ).
Whence, CL[eo] has no anti-theorems. Secondly, that it is an infectious sublogic
of Kw3 can be easily realized by noting that the truth-value e is an infectious
element in the algebra FP, and that it is undesignated in the corresponding
logical matrix. Third, and finally, it can be observed that the logical matrix
underlying CL[eo] diverges as little as possible from the logical matrix inducing
Kw3 . In fact, this can be read off the “truth-tables” for FP. While this algebra
has an additional value compared to the 3-element weak Kleene algebra, said
extra truth-value o follows as closely as possible the behavior of the infectious
value e—“mimicking” it in almost all contexts, as it were. Indeed, when the
truth-value o is an input of an operation the result of such an operation is al-
most always the result that we would have if o were replaced by e—except when
all the inputs are o, in which case the result is o, too. We take these to be the
technical incarnation of the idea that understanding PAIfde as a paraconsistent
infectious sublogic of Kw3 requires working with a logical matrix that would differ
from that underlying weak Kleene logic as seamlessly as possible.
Technicalities aside, we should flag out that matters of interpretation re-
garding the truth-values underlying the algebra in question are indeed unclear.
Thus, while in the context of the WK algebra it is common to interpret the
truth-value e being assigned to a formula as the fact that said formula is mean-
ingless or nonsensical, it is difficult to transpose this reading to the present
context. In particular, it is difficult to understand what sort of phenomena is
represented by the assignment of o to a given formula—an interpretative in-
convenience already acknowledged by F. Paoli in [31]. Nevertheless, our goal in
this section is not to provide a philosophically convincing matrix semantics for
PAIfde, but rather to simply provide a semantics of this sort for it. Therefore,
to proving that this can be done with the help of the matrix outlined before we
now turn.
Theorem 2.6. The Fmla-Fmla fragment of CL[eo] = PAIfde
Proof. Assume ϕ CL ψ and V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), and suppose for reductio that
ϕ 2CL[eo] ψ. Then, there is a CL[eo]-valuation v such that v(ϕ) ∈ {t,o} and
6The Fmla-Fmla fragment of a logic L is the restriction of L to what is called, e.g., in [26,
p. 108] the Fmla-Fmla framework. That is to say, set of inferences that are valid in such a
logic which have only one formula as a premise and only one formula as a conclusion.
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v(ψ) ∈ {e, f}. In case v(ϕ) = t this would allow us to infer, given the operations
in FP, that for all p ∈ V ar(ϕ), v(p) ∈ {t, f}. From that and our assumptions,
we could moreover infer that for all q ∈ V ar(ψ), v(q) ∈ {t, f}. In other words, v
must be a valuation such that v(ϕ) = t and v(ψ) = f , whence ϕ 2CL ψ. But this
contradicts our initial assumption, from which we infer that v(ϕ) 6= t. Then, in
case v(ϕ) = o, given the operations in FP, we could infer that for all p ∈ V ar(ϕ),
v(p) = o. Moreover, our supposition that v(ψ) ∈ {e, f} implies there is some
q ∈ V ar(ψ) such that v(q) 6= o. However, this contradicts our initial assumption
that V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), whence we should infer that v(ϕ) 6= o. Therefore, if
ϕ CL ψ and V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), then there cannot be a CL[eo]-valuation v such
that v(ϕ) ∈ {t,o} and v(ψ) ∈ {e, f}. This establishes that ϕ CL[eo] ψ.
Assume either ϕ 2CL ψ, or V ar(ψ) * V ar(ϕ). If the former is the case, then
there is a CL-valuation v such that v(ϕ) = t and v(ψ) = f . However, given
CL-valuations are a subset of CL[eo]-valuations, this establishes that there is a
CL[eo]-valuation v′ such that v′(ϕ) = t and v′(ψ) = f . From this it follows that
ϕ 2CL[eo] ψ. If the latter is the case, it is possible to construct a CL[eo]-valuation
v such that:
v(p) =
{
e if p ∈ V ar(ψ) \ V ar(ϕ)
o otherwise
For such a valuation it is possible to show, through a simple induction on the
complexity of formulae, that v(ϕ) = o while v(ψ) = e. From this it follows that
ϕ 2CL[eo] ψ.
Thus, knowing that the Fmla-Fmla fragment of CL[eo] = PAIfde in what
follows we will allow ourselves to refer to the Fmla-Fmla fragment of CL[eo]
as PAIfde , and to similarly refer to the 4-valued CL[eo]-valuations as PAIfde-
valuations, without loss of generality.
Having provided a semantic characterization of PAIfde in terms of a 4-valued
logical matrix, in the next section we discuss with more detail some aspects of
the employed algebraic structure, connecting it with the so-called P lonka sums
and offering potential generalizations for other similar logical systems.
3. Further remarks on the semantics
The aim of this section is to delve a little bit deeper into some aspects of the
semantics just offered. To this end, we divide it into two subsections. In the
first, we discuss the extent to which some constructions called P lonka sums
can be used to better understand the matrix semantics presented above. In
the second, we show that some features of said semantics can be generalized in
order to provide matrices for similar fragments of other logics—fragments that
also respect Parry’s Proscriptive Principle.7
7We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer whose deeply interesting questions led to
writing this section, and we would also like to thank F. Paoli for very insightful discussions
on the elements of this section.
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3.1. P lonka sums
P lonka sums are operations on algebras that allow to define new structures
from a previously given collection thereof. As stated in [5], they are useful
tools to study the so-called regular varieties, that is to say, equational classes
axiomatized by equations that contain the same variables on both sides. But
this is something we will not discuss in-depth here. Instead, in what follows,
we will show the extent to which the aforementioned algebra FP featured in
our matrix semantics for PAIfde can be understood as the P lonka sum of other
algebras—more precisely, of Boolean algebras. For this purpose, we will detail
some pieces of terminology present in some works in Abstract Algebraic Logic
first.
Before moving on, it may as well be noted that FP is a special kind of al-
gebra. It is what F. Paoli and M. Pra Baldi call in [32] a generalized involutive
bisemilattice. A structure of this sort is an algebra counting with two partial
orders (in our case, where x, y ∈ {t,o, e, f}, the orders ≤∧ and ≤∨ respectively
defined by letting x ≤∧ y if and only if x ∧ y = x, and x ≤∨ y if and only if
x∨ y = y), with an involution (in our case, the operation ¬), with no constants
for the infimum and the supremum elements. Interestingly enough, these au-
thors show that every generalized involutive bisemilattice is decomposable as a
P lonka sum over a semilattice direct system of Boolean algebras [32, Theorem
4]. Whence, our comments below oriented at representing FP in this way pro-
vide an exemplification of their general result. In this vein, then, let us proceed
in detailing some crucial definitions.
Definition 3.1 ([4, 5, 6, 32]). A semilattice direct system of algebras of language
L is a triple A = 〈{Ai}i∈I , I, {fij | i ≤I j}〉, where:
(i) I = 〈I,≤I〉 is a join-semilattice,
(ii) {Ai}i∈I is a family of similar algebras of language L with parwise disjoint
universes,
(iii) for every i, j ∈ I such that i ≤I j, fij is an homomorphism from Ai to
Aj , and moreover fii is the identity map for every i ∈ I, and whenever
i ≤I j ≤I k, we have that fik = fjk ◦ fij .
Definition 3.2 ([4, 5, 6, 32]). The P lonka sum Pl(A) of a semilattice direct
system of algebras A = 〈{Ai}i∈I , I, {fij | i ≤I j}〉 is the algebra of language
L whose universe is ⋃i∈IAi, and for which every basic n-ary operation ¶ of A
(with n ≥ 1) is defined as follows, where a1, . . . , an ∈
⋃
i∈IAi:
¶Pl(A)(a1, . . . , an) = ¶Aj (fiij(a1), . . . , finj(an))
where a1 ∈ Ai1 , . . . , an ∈ Ain and j = i1 ∨ · · · ∨ im.
With these tools at hand, it is routine to show that the algebra FP can be
obtained as a P lonka sum of Boolean algebras. To see this, let Ai denote the
2-element Boolean algebra with universe {t, f}, and let Aj and Ai∨j denote
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two disjoint but isomorphic 1-element trivial Boolean algebras with universes,
respectively, {o} and {e}. Then, consider the semilattice direct system A′ =
〈{Ai, }i∈I′ , I
′
, {fij | i ≤I′ j}〉, where I
′
is the join-semilattice depicted by the
following Hasse diagram:
i ∨ j
i j
Given these elements, it is straightforward to observe that FP can be con-
ceived as Pl(A′), the P lonka sum of the aforementioned semilattice direct system
of Boolean algebras. Notice, furthermore, that the mappings in {fij | i ≤I′ j}
are unique, whence such a sum is uniquely determined.
Interestingly, many scholars have shown that P lonka sums can not only
be applied to certain collections of algebras, but also to collections of logical
matrices. Thus, one may wonder whether our own matrix 〈FP, {t,o}〉 for PAIfde
can be obtained as the P lonka sum of a previously given system of matrices.
Considering this question already requires noting that P lonka sums for matrices
are not uniquely defined, but rather defined for different kinds of systems of
logical matrices. Up to now, these comprise the so-called direct systems of
logical matrices and the r-direct systems of logical matrices, which we define
below.
Definition 3.3 ([4, 5]). A direct (alternatively, r-direct) system of logical ma-
trices of language L is a triple M = 〈{〈Ai, Di〉}i∈I , I, {fij | i ≤I j}〉, where:
(i) I = 〈I,≤I〉 is a join-semilattice,
(ii) {〈Ai, Di〉}i∈I is a family of matrices with parwise disjoint universes (al-
ternatively, where also I+ = {i ∈ I | Di 6= ∅} is a sub-semilattice of
I),
(iii) for every i, j ∈ I where i ≤I j, fij is an homomorphism from Ai to Aj ,
such that fij(Di) ⊆ Dj (alternatively, such that f−1ij (Dj) = Di when-
ever Dj 6= ∅), and moreover fii is the identity map for every i ∈ I, and
whenever i ≤I j ≤I k, we have that fik = fjk ◦ fij .
Definition 3.4 ([4, 5]). The P lonka sum Pl(M) of a direct (alternatively, r-
direct) system of logical matrices M = 〈{〈Ai, Di〉}i∈I , I, {fij | i ≤I j}〉 is the
logical matrix 〈Pl(A),⋃i∈I Di〉 of language L, where Pl(A) is the P lonka sum
of the semilattice direct system of algebras formed by the algebra-reducts of the
logical matrices in M.
In this regard, it is important to notice that given that FP can be uniquely
determined as the P lonka sum of the aforementioned semilattice direct system
of algebras, this limits our choices of direct (r-direct) systems of matrices that
would induce the matrix 〈FP, {t,o}〉. In particular, the only reasonable choice
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given our previous remarks would be the system M′ = 〈{〈Ai, Di〉}i∈I , I′ , {fij |
i ≤I j}〉, where Mi = 〈Ai, {t}〉, Mj = 〈Aj , {o}〉, Mi∨j = 〈Ai∨j , ∅〉—where all
these elements are as in the system A′ above.
However, such a family of logical matrices cannot constitute a direct system
of logical matrices because it does not fulfill clause (iii) of Definition 3.3. To
see this, notice that the requirements that fi,i∨j(Di) ⊆ Di∨j and fj,i∨j(Dj) ⊆
Di∨j would translate both into the condition {e} ⊆ ∅, which cannot be true.
Similarly, the family of matrices M′ cannot constitute a r-direct system of logical
matrices because it does not fulfill clause (ii) of Definition 3.3. To see this, notice
that the parenthetical requirement asks that the set of indices of logical matrices
in the system counting with non-empty sets of designated values should form a
sub-semilattice of the original semilattice of indices, which is not the case here,
since the set {i, j} does not satisfy this condition. Whence, our own matrix
semantics for PAIfde cannot—under the currently available definitions—be seen
as the P lonka sum of a direct or r-direct system of logical matrices.
This, of course, does not prevent the exploration of further accounts of sys-
tems of logical matrices that would accommodate this issue, allowing us to look
at our matrix as the P lonka sum of an appropriately conceived system of logical
matrices. To wit, the notion of r-direct system of logical matrices was only
recently developed by S. Bonzio and M. Pra Baldi in [4], in order to express
certain logical matrices as P lonka sums—something that was not possible before
their introduction of such a novel definition. It would be extremely interesting
to explore more possibilities along this path in the near future.
In line with these considerations connecting our semantics with P lonka sums
and some other elements of Abstract Algebraic Logic, one may wonder what the
answer to a plethora of other questions are. For instance, regarding our matrix
semantics for PAIfde we could name the following: what does a full description
of its matrix models look like, and which are its reduced models? What are
its quasivariety semantics, and is it possible to provide algebraic versions of the
completeness and Cut Elimination results for it? All these questions are deeply
intriguing, and it would be immensely interesting to explore them. However,
discussing them here would take us a little bit too far afield, and would require
more space than we have. This being said, we hope to tackle them in future
work.
3.2. Some generalizations
The matrix semantics for PAIfde that we presented above provides a way to ap-
proach an interesting fragment of Classical Logic—i.e., those Fmla-Fmla valid
inferences of Classical Logic that also respect Parry’s Proscriptive Principle. In
other words, according to the definition below, it provides a matrix semantics
for the Fmla-Fmla fragment of CLPP.
Definition 3.5 ([18]). Given a logic L, the Fmla-Fmla fragment of L that sat-
isfies Parry’s Proscriptive Principle is the Fmla-Fmla fragment of LPP, which
can be defined as follows:
11
ϕ `LPP ψ ⇐⇒
{
ϕ `L ψ, and
V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ)
In what follows we show that the elements of our semantics can be useful
in offering—given an arbitrary matrix logic L—a matrix semantics for LPP. To
show this, let us first fix some terminology.
Definition 3.6. An algebra A has distinct elements j, k ∈ A such that j “mim-
ics” k if and only if for all n-ary operations ¶ of A and all {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A:
if {j} ( {a1, . . . , an}, then ¶A(a1, . . . , an) = ¶A((a1, . . . , an)[j/k])
where (a1, . . . , an)[j/k] is the result of replacing each occurrence of j for an
occurrence of k in a1, . . . , an.
Definition 3.7. An algebra A has a universally idempotent element j if and
only if for all n-ary operations ¶ of A and all {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A:
if {j} = {a1, . . . , an}, then ¶A(a1, . . . , an) = j
We now move on to consider extensions of algebras with infectious or uni-
versally idempotent and mimicking elements.
Definition 3.8 ([12]). Given an algebra A, the algebra A[u] is its extension
with an infectious element u /∈ A, such that for all n-ary operations ¶ of A[u]
and all {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A ∪ {u}:
¶A[u](a1, . . . , an) =
{
u if u ∈ {a1, . . . , an}
¶A(a1, . . . , an) otherwise
Definition 3.9. Given an algebra A, the algebra A[j] is its extension with a
universally idempotent element j /∈ A that “mimics” an element k ∈ A, such
that for all n-ary operations ¶ of A[j] and all {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A ∪ {j}:
¶A[j](a1, . . . , an) =

j if {j} = {a1, . . . , an}
¶A((a1, . . . , an)[j/k]) if {j} ( {a1, . . . , an}
¶A(a1, . . . , an) otherwise
where (a1, . . . , an)[j/k] is the result of replacing each occurrence of j for an
occurrence of k in a1, . . . , an.
Below, we will show that given a matrix logic L induced by a single logical
matrix, extending it in the way in which our semantics for PAIfde extend the
semantics for Classical Logic, gives a semantics for LPP—regardless of whether
L counts with anti-theorems or not. This result is, in fact, a generalization of
Theorem 2.6, as a closer look into the proof will reveal.
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Theorem 3.10. Let L be a logic (possibly counting with anti-theorems) induced
by the single matrixM = 〈A, D〉, and let L[uj] be the logic induced by the single
matrix M[uj] = 〈A[uj], D ∪ {j}〉, where A[u] is the algebra resulting from
extending A with an infectious element u, and A[uj] is the algebra resulting
from extending A[u] with a universally idempotent element j that “mimics” the
infectious element u. Then, the Fmla-Fmla fragment of L[uj] = LPP.
Proof. Assume ϕ L ψ and V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), and suppose for reductio that
ϕ 2L[uj] ψ. Then, there is a L[uj]-valuation v such that v(ϕ) ∈ D ∪ {j} and
v(ψ) /∈ D∪{j}. In case v(ϕ) ∈ D this would allow us to infer that v(ϕ) /∈ {u, j}
and, given the operations in A[uj], that for all p ∈ V ar(ϕ), v(p) /∈ {u, j}. From
that and our assumptions, we could moreover infer that for all q ∈ V ar(ψ),
v(q) /∈ {u, j}. In other words, v must be a valuation such that v(ϕ) ∈ D and
v(ψ) /∈ D, whence ϕ 2L ψ. But this contradicts our initial assumption, from
which we infer that v(ϕ) /∈ D. Then, in case v(ϕ) = j, given the operations
in A[uj], we could infer that for all p ∈ V ar(ϕ), v(p) = j. Moreover, our
supposition that v(ψ) /∈ D ∪ {j} implies there is some q ∈ V ar(ψ) such that
v(q) 6= j. However, this contradicts our initial assumption that V ar(ψ) ⊆
V ar(ϕ), whence we should infer that v(ϕ) 6= j. Therefore, if ϕ L ψ and
V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ), then there cannot be a L[uj]-valuation v such that v(ϕ) ∈
D ∪ {j} and v(ψ) /∈ D ∪ {j}. This establishes that ϕ L[uj] ψ.
Assume either ϕ 2L ψ, or V ar(ψ) * V ar(ϕ). If the former is the case, then
there is a L-valuation v such that v(ϕ) ∈ D and v(ψ) /∈ D. However, given
L-valuations are a subset of L[uj]-valuations, this establishes that there is a
L[uj]-valuation v′ such that v′(ϕ) ∈ D and v′(ψ) /∈ D. From this it follows that
ϕ 2L[uj] ψ. If the latter is the case, it is possible to construct a L[uj]-valuation
v such that:
v(p) =
{
u if p ∈ V ar(ψ) \ V ar(ϕ)
j otherwise
For such a valuation it is possible to show, through a simple induction on the
complexity of formulae, that v(ϕ) = j while v(ψ) = u. From this it follows that
ϕ 2L[uj] ψ.
A number of things can be said as closing remarks to this section. First, the
previous results suggest semantics for LPP where L is a sublogic of Classical Logic
counting with anti-theorems, like strong Kleene logic K3. Semantics of this sort
were already available for anti-theoremless sublogics of Classical Logic, like G.
Priest’s LP, but were not found anywhere for sublogics of this kind that have
anti-theorems. Secondly, and more importantly, the above definitions serves as
a technical vindication of the intuitions laid out in the previous section, when
reflecting upon the necessary ingredients to arrive at a matrix semantics for
PAIfde starting from matrix semantics for K
w
3 . More particularly, this allows
to understand the FP algebra as the algebra B[eo], where B is the 2-element
Boolean algebra, B[e] is the extension of B with an infectious element e, and
B[eo] is the extension of B[e] with a universally idempotent element o that
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mimics the infectious element e. Furthermore, these remarks explain the no-
tation for CL[eo], whose Fmla-Fmla fragment coincides—as we proved in the
previous section—with PAIfde.
Having said all this, we now proceed to the task of endowing our target
logic with a simple sequent calculus. In doing so, we will make use of the
semantic developments above, by employing them both to prove the soundness
and completeness of the target proof theory.
4. A simple sequent calculus for Parry’s logic
In this section we provide a sound and complete sequent calculus for PAIfde, that
is to say, for the set of first-degree entailments valid in Parry’s logic of Analytic
Implication. Proof-systems for Parry’s logic as a whole have been given by
W. T. Parry himself in [35] and, as regards PAIfde, although there is no axiom
system that characterizes it, a natural deduction calculus has been presented
by F. Johnson in [28].
Here, with the purpose of endowing our target logic with a Gentzen-style
sequent calculus we will follow the ideas and techniques discussed by R. French in
[24], where a calculus of this sort is given for K. Fine’s axiomatization of the first-
degree entailments that are valid in R. Angell’s logic of Analytic Containment
AC—in other words, for ACfde. For this task, we will work with sequents of
the form Γ  ∆ defined as pairs 〈Γ,∆〉 where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of
formulae. In this context, sequents will receive a concrete interpretation, as we
will establish that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm is provable in the target calculus if
and only if the first-degree entailment ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm is valid
in PAI—in other words, if and only if ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm. It
will be important to bear this in mind when conducting the soundness and
completeness proofs.
The main idea behind the calculus that we introduce below—borrowed from
R. French’s [24] and from M. I. Corbala´n and M. Coniglio’s [14]—is to have
sequent rules (be it initial sequents, operational or structural rules), that are
bound to linguistic restrictions. That is to say, rules that can be applied only if
certain constraints regarding the parametric or active formulae are met. These
restrictions guarantee that the rules preserve the satisfaction of the Proscriptive
Principle or, put differently, that the rules are subject-matter preserving. This
is completely analogous to what is done in [24], although the conception of
subject-matter underlying R. Angell’s logic (and thus the linguistic restrictions
needed to secure subject-matter preservation) are different in that case.8
We will now proceed to present the set of rules that define our calculus GPAIfde ,
later showing the adequacy of the formalism. In what follows it will be important
8As witnessed by the remarks below, R. French states in [24] that given Angell’s conception
of the subject-matter of a given formula ϕ, such a subject-matter can be formalized as t(ϕ) =
{p ∈ V ar | p appears in ϕ under the scope of an even number of negations} ∪ {p ∈ V ar | p
appears in ϕ under the scope of an odd number of negations}—whereas we should remember
that, as discussed above, given the conception of subject-matter underlying Parry’s logic, such
a subject-matter can be formalized as V ar(ϕ).
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to state explicitly that Lit will denote the set of literals of our language L, that
is, the collection of all the propositional variables p, q, r, . . . and their respective
negations ¬p,¬q,¬r, . . .—letting p±, q±, r±, . . . denote schematic literals. Let
us note, in passing, that for Θ ⊆ FOR(L), V ar(Θ) = ⋃
θ∈Θ
V ar(θ).
Definition 4.1. The calculus GPAIfde is constituted by the following rules:
Initial Sequents:
[Initial] Γ, p  p,∆ where V ar(∆, p) ⊆ V ar(Γ, p)
Structural Rules:
Γ, ϕ, ϕ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∆ [WL] Γ  ϕ,ϕ,∆Γ  ϕ,∆ [WR]
Γ, ϕ ∆ Γ′  ϕ,∆′
Γ,Γ′ ∆,∆′ [Cut ]
Operational Rules:
Γ  ϕ,∆
Γ,¬ϕ ∆ [¬L]† Γ, ϕ ∆Γ  ¬ϕ,∆ [¬R]‡
† : where ∆ 6= ∅ ‡ : where V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ)
Γ, ϕ ∆ Γ, ψ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ∆ [∨L] Γ  ϕ,ψ,∆Γ  ϕ ∨ ψ,∆ [∨R]
Γ, ϕ, ψ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ∆ [∧L] Γ  ϕ,∆ Γ  ψ,∆Γ  ϕ ∧ ψ,∆ [∧R]
“De Morgan” Rules:
Γ, ϕ ∆
Γ,¬¬ϕ ∆ [¬¬L] Γ  ϕ,∆Γ  ¬¬ϕ,∆ [¬¬R]
Γ,¬ϕ ∆ Γ,¬ψ ∆
Γ,¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∆ [¬∧L] Γ  ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆Γ  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),∆ [¬∧R]
Γ,¬ϕ,¬ψ ∆
Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∆ [¬∨L] Γ  ¬ϕ,∆ Γ  ¬ψ,∆Γ  ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ),∆ [¬∨R]
Let us make a few remarks about the calculus we just presented. As we shall
see later using a simple argument stemming from the way in which we prove
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our completeness result below, the rule of Cut is eliminable from GPAIfde . Also
regarding the structural rules, it shall be noted that the [Initial] is a form of
the structural rule of Identity or Reflexivity, with Left and Right Weakening
“absorbed”—to some extent. Indeed, as we will show below, adopting these
initial sequents allows for the rule of Left Weakening to be admissible in its
unrestricted form, while allowing for the admissibility of a constrained rule of
Right Weakening, guaranteeing the satisfaction of the Proscriptive Principle.
Observation 4.2. The following forms of the Weakening rules are admissible
in GPAIfde :
Γ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∆ [KL] Γ ∆Γ  ϕ,∆ [KR]‡
‡ : where V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ)
Proof. The proof is a straightforward modification of R. French’s proof of his
Theorem 3.6 in [24], for an analogous fact regarding the admissibility of an-
other restricted form of the Weakening rules in his calculus for Angell’s logic
of Analytic Containment.9 Moving on to the proper proof, regarding [KL],
suppose we have a derivation of Γ  ∆. We can turn this into a derivation of
Γ, ϕ  ∆ by adding ϕ to the left-hand side of each of the nodes of the deriva-
tion, as the uppermost node will still constitute a rightful instance of [Initial].
Similarly, regarding [KR]‡, suppose we have a derivation of Γ  ∆ and that
V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ). We can turn this into a derivation of Γ  ϕ,∆ by, first,
adding Γ to the left-hand side of each of the nodes of the derivation, and ϕ to
the right-hand side of each of the nodes of the derivation. In such a case, the
uppermost node will still constitute a rightful instance of [Initial], although we
will end up with an endsequent of the form Γ,Γ  ∆, ϕ. Secondly, to turn this
into a derivation of Γ  ϕ,∆, we apply |Γ|-many times the rule [WL] in order
to arrive at our target sequent Γ  ϕ,∆.
An additional point of interest noticed by an anonymous reviewer, resides
in comparing our calculus with those proposed for the weak Kleene logics, in
our case, the calculus for paracomplete weak Kleene logic Kw3 presented in [14]
being the relevant one. In this respect, it is important to highlight four items.
First, as mentioned earlier, our calculus has axioms with contexts or side-
formulae which “absorb” the Weakening rules—in their constrained admissible
forms stated above. In the case of the calculus for Kw3 , axioms have no contexts
or side-formulae and the Weakening rules are primitive. But nothing really
important depends on this, for axioms could have been formulated with such
contexts, thereby “absorbing” the Weakening rules in their unconstrained forms.
This brings us to a second, already visible issue, regarding the Weakening rules.
9To be more precise: the only modification needed for his argument to apply to our case
lies in replacing the mention of t(A) and t(Γ) in the proof of the aforementioned theorem,
respectively, for V ar(ϕ) and V ar(Γ).
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Whereas in our calculus the only admissible form of such rules is the one where
the Right Weakening rule is constrained, in the calculus for Kw3 both Weakening
rules are unconstrained. A third focal point can be placed over the Disjunction
rules, especially the [∨R] rule. Thus, while it has no restrictions in our calculus,
in the calculus for Kw3 it does have a restriction, requiring that V ar(ϕ,ψ) ⊆
V ar(Γ). The reason for this divergence resides in the different strengths that
the Weakening rules, especially the [KR] rule, have in both systems. Thus, in
our case there is no instance where the premise of the [∨R] rule that can violate
the Proscriptive Principle, because the admissible forms of the [KR] rule would
not allow for such a thing. In the case of the calculus for Kw3 , however, there
could be a case where the premise of the [∨R] rule satisfies the Proscriptive
Principle without its conclusion doing so, precisely because one of the disjuncts
could be obtained by an application of the unrestricted (and, therefore, not
necessarily Proscriptive Principle-complying) [KR] rule. A fourth and final
comparison point can be considered around the [¬L] rule. Traditionally, having
this rule in its unrestricted form corresponds to the validity of Explosion in
the logic in question. However, given the remarks made in Section 2 it is clear
that such an inference is not generally valid in PAIfde, even though it is valid
in Kw3 . In this vein, the only forms of Explosion that are valid in our logic
are those respecting the Proscriptive Principle—that is to say, those inferences
ϕ∧¬ϕ  ψ where V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(ϕ). Concomitantly, this explains the presence
of the unrestricted [¬L] rule in the calculus for Kw3 , and the presence of a rule in
our calculus which is restricted precisely because of the constraints imposed to
the [KR] rule, which guarantee the satisfaction of the Proscriptive Principle.10
This being said, let us deal with the proof of the soundness result for our
calculus. Thus, the next result we discuss shows that every provable sequent of
GPAIfde encodes a corresponding first-degree entailment that is valid in PAI—or,
what is the same, a valid inference of PAIfde. For the purpose of proving this,
we will appeal to the characterization of said set of valid entailments in the
paragraphs above.
Lemma 4.3. All the rules of GPAIfde preserve PAIfde-validity. In other words,
for each of the rules of the calculus, if the premise sequents are valid in PAIfde,
so is the conclusion sequent of that rule.
Proof. We show this by cases—focusing on the restricted rules and leaving the
rest as exercises to the reader—assuming the premise sequents of a rule are valid
in PAIfde, and later proving that its conclusion sequent is also valid in said logic.
In all cases below, we will assume that Γ can be redescribed as γ1, . . . , γn, and
that ∆ can be redescribed as δ1, . . . , δm.
[Initial]: Suppose v is a PAIfde-valuation such that v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ p) ⊆
{t,o} and that V ar(∆, p) ⊆ V ar(Γ, p). If v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ p) = t, then
10A further, though inessential, divergence from our calculus and the calculus for Kw3 resides
in the presence of the so-called De Morgan rules in the former and their absence in the latter.
This difference is inessential, because although they make things more manageable for the
completeness proof of our own calculus, they are derivable in it as well as in the calculus for
Kw3 .
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all q ∈ V ar(Γ, p) are such that v(q) ∈ {t, f} and in particular v(p) = t.
Whence, v(p ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm) = t. If v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ p) = o, then all
q ∈ V ar(Γ, p) are such that v(q) = o. Given V ar(∆, p) ⊆ V ar(Γ, p), we
know that all q′ ∈ V ar(∆, p) are such that v(q′) = o. Whence, v(p ∨ δ1 ∨
· · · ∨ δm) = o. Therefore, γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ p PAIfde p ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm.
[¬L]†: Assume ∆ 6= ∅, such that γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn PAIfde ϕ ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm.
Suppose v is a PAIfde-valuation such that v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ ¬ϕ) ⊆ {t,o}.
If v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ ¬ϕ) = t, then v(ϕ) = f , whence by hypothesis it is
guaranteed that v(δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm) ⊆ {t,o}. If v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ ¬ϕ) = o,
then all q ∈ V ar(Γ,¬ϕ) are such that v(q) = o, whence by hypothesis all
q′ ∈ V ar(∆) are such that v(q′) = o, which entails that v(δ1∨· · ·∨δm) = o.
Therefore, γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ ¬ϕ PAIfde δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm.
[¬R]‡: Assume V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ) and γ1∧· · ·∧γn∧ϕ PAIfde δ1∨· · ·∨ δm.
Notice that these two assumptions imply that V ar(∆) ⊆ V ar(Γ). Suppose
v is a PAIfde-valuation such that v(γ1∧· · ·∧γn) ⊆ {t,o}. If v(γ1∧· · ·∧γn) =
t, then all q ∈ V ar(Γ) are such that v(q) ∈ {t, f}. If, additionally, v(ϕ) =
t, then by hypothesis v(δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm) ⊆ {t,o}. Otherwise, if v(ϕ) = f ,
then v(¬ϕ) = t. This, given the fact that V ar(∆) ⊆ V ar(Γ) leads to the
fact that all q′ ∈ V ar(∆) are such that v(q′) ∈ {t, f}. All of this implies
that v(¬ϕ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm) = t. If v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn) = o, then all q ∈ V ar(Γ)
are such that v(q) = o. Given V ar(∆) ⊆ V ar(Γ) and V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ),
we know that all q′ ∈ V ar(∆,¬ϕ) are such that v(q′) = o. Whence,
v(¬ϕ∨ δ1∨· · ·∨ δm) = o. Therefore, γ1∧· · ·∧γn PAIfde ¬ϕ∨ δ1∨· · ·∨ δm.
The case of [Cut] as well as the case of the [W ], [∧], [∨], and the “De Morgan”
rules are straightforward and thus are left to the reader as an exercise.
Theorem 4.4 (Soundness). If the sequent ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm is provable
in GPAIfde , then ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm.
Proof. We know that the initial sequents are valid in PAIfde and that all rules
preserve PAIfde validity. A straightforward induction on the height of the deriva-
tion shows (using Lemma 4.3 in the inductive step) that all provable sequents
encode inferences that are valid in PAIfde. Thus, if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm is
provable in GPAIfde , then the corresponding inference is valid in PAIfde—in other
words, ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm.
Having discussed soundness, we will now turn to the more laborious task of
providing a completeness proof for GPAIfde with regard to PAIfde. To achieve this
goal, and because it will make things fairly more manageable in the proofs below,
we will now present a further restricted calculus that is nonetheless equivalent
to the one we already introduced.
Definition 4.5. The calculus G−PAIfde is the result of replacing [Initial] with the
following rule:
[LiteralInitial] Γ, p  p,∆ where Γ,∆ ⊆ Lit and V ar(∆, p) ⊆ V ar(Γ, p)
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Lemma 4.6. If a sequent is derivable in GPAIfde it is derivable in G−PAIfde , and
vice-versa.
Proof. In the Appendix.
With these tools in hand we now move on to the proper completeness result.
Theorem 4.7 (Completeness). If ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm, then the
sequent ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm is provable in GPAIfde .
Proof. We start by assuming that the sequent ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm is un-
provable in GPAIfde . We, then, consider two cases:
(i) V ar(ψ1, . . . , ψm) * V ar(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)
(ii) V ar(ψ1, . . . , ψm) ⊆ V ar(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)
showing that in both cases we can design valuations that witness ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧
ϕn 2PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm.
Case (i): if V ar(ψ1, . . . , ψm) * V ar(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is the case, consider a
PAIfde-valuation v such that:
v(p) =
{
e if p ∈ V ar(ψ1, . . . , ψm) \ V ar(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)
o otherwise
It is then straightforward to notice, by a simple induction on the complexity
of formulae, that there will be a ψi ∈ {ψ1, . . . , ψm} such that v(ψi) = e, whereas
all ϕj ∈ {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} will be such that v(ϕj) = o. A quick inspections of the
FP algebra allows to notice that this renders v(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn) = o, while at the
same time giving v(ψ1∨· · ·∨ψm) = e. Whence, ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn 2PAIfde ψ1∨· · ·∨ψm.
Case (ii): if V ar(ψ1, . . . , ψm) ⊆ V ar(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is the case, in order to show
that ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn 2PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm we will apply the method of reduction
trees as explored, e.g., in [47] by G. Takeuti and in [42] by D. Ripley.
The idea is to start with a sequent that we assume to be unprovable later
extending it in a finite series of steps with the help of reduction rules that will
finally render a reduction tree. Thus, we start with an unprovable sequent and
build a tree above it, with each node consisting of a sequent that results from
an application of the reduction rules to the sequent below it. As we extend the
tree, we will sometimes find that the tip of a branch is an instance of one of
[LiteralInitial]—in such a case we will consider this branch closed and will stop
performing reductions on it. Contrary to that, if a branch is not closed after
applying all the possible reduction rules, we will consider this branch open. Let
us now detail the rules that we apply to the sequents at the top of each branch
of the tree, at each stage of the reduction process. Let us note, in passing, that
this technique requires an enumeration of the formulae of our language.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ, ϕ∧ψ∆, extend the branch with the sequent
Γ, ϕ, ψ ∆.
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• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ  ϕ ∧ ψ,∆, extend the branch by splitting in
two. To one new branch, add the sequent Γϕ,∆; to the other, add the sequent
Γ  ψ,∆
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γϕ∨ψ,∆, extend the branch with the sequent
Γ  ϕ,ψ,∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ∆, extend the branch by splitting in
two. To one new branch, add the sequent Γ, ϕ∆; to the other, add the sequent
Γ, ψ  ∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ,¬¬ϕ∆, extend the branch with the sequent
Γ, ϕ  ∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ¬¬ϕ,∆, extend the branch with the sequent
Γ  ϕ,∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ,¬(ϕ∧ψ)∆, extend the branch by splitting
in two. To one new branch, add the sequent Γ,¬ϕ  ∆; to the other, add the
sequent Γ,¬ψ ∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),∆, extend the branch with the
sequent Γ  ¬ϕ,¬ψ,∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)  ∆, extend the branch with the
sequent Γ,¬ϕ,¬ψ ∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ¬(ϕ∨ψ),∆, extend the branch by splitting
in two. To one new branch, add the sequent Γ  ¬ϕ,∆; to the other, add the
sequent Γ  ¬ψ,∆.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ,¬ϕ  ∆, consider whether ¬ϕ is of the form
¬(ψ∧χ) or ¬(ψ∨χ), or ¬¬ψ, in which case proceed to apply the corresponding
reduction rules detailed above.11 If this is not the case, then if ∆ 6= ∅, extend the
branch with the sequent Γ  ϕ,∆; otherwise, if ∆ = ∅, do nothing and proceed
to reduce the next formula, if there is one.
• To reduce a sequent of the form Γ  ¬ϕ,∆, consider whether ¬ϕ is of the form
¬(ψ∧χ) or ¬(ψ∨χ), or ¬¬ψ, in which case proceed to apply the corresponding
reduction rules detailed above. If this is not the case, then if V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ),
extend the branch with the sequent Γ, ϕ  ∆; otherwise, if V ar(ϕ) * V ar(Γ),
do nothing and proceed to reduce the next formula, if there is one.
Suppose we star with a sequent of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm where
V ar(ψ1, . . . , ψm) ⊆ V ar(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) and follow this process as many times as
necessary for there to be no more legal applications of the reduction rules.
Then, either all branches of the tree will be closed (whence, we have a proof
of the sequent that was assumed to be unprovable, contradicting our initial
hypothesis), or some branch will be open. Suppose the latter is the case, and
that there is an open branch. The next step in our proof is to show that it is
possible to find a PAIfde-valuation that witnesses ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn 2PAIfde ψ1∨· · ·∨ψm.
For this purpose, let us temporarily relabel the sequents in the open branch
as Γ1 ∆1, . . . ,Γk ∆k, letting Γ1 ∆1 be ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm and letting
11Notice that, if this is not the case, then ¬ϕ is a negated literal—that is, ϕ = ¬p, for some
propositional variable p.
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Γk  ∆k be the sequent at the tip of the open branch. Furthermore, let the
sequent Γ  ∆—where Γ = ∪{Γi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} and ∆ = ∪{∆i | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}—be
the sequent that “collects” all the sequents in the open branch. Consider the
PAIfde-valuation v such that:
v(p) =
{
t if p ∈ Γ or ¬p ∈ ∆
f otherwise
We now prove by induction on the complexity of ϕ that v is a PAIfde-valuation
such that v(ϕ) = t if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ and v(ϕ) = f if and only if ϕ ∈ ∆.
Before going into the base cases though, lets us highlight a number of facts
regarding literals and our newly defined Γ and ∆. As is easy to observe, all
these remarks can be derived from the definition of Γ and ∆, the fact that none
of the Γi  ∆i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is an instance of [LiteralInitial], the fact that the
reduction rules preserve the satisfaction of the Proscriptive Principle, and the
further pair of facts that propositional variables cannot be reduced by any of the
reduction rules (and so are “preserved” up in the reduction process), and that
if literals of the form ¬p cannot be reduced by any of the reduction rules, they
are “preserved” up in the reduction process. So, these remarks are: (i) for all
propositional variables p, p /∈ Γ∩∆; (ii) for all negated literals ¬p, ¬p /∈ Γ∩∆;
(iii) for all propositional variables p, {p,¬p} * Γ; (iv) for all propositional
variables p, {p,¬p} * ∆.12
Base cases:
• If ϕ = p, then if p ∈ Γ, v(p) = t by definition of v. Otherwise, if p ∈ ∆, for
example, v(p) = f by definition. Notice that, by the remarks above, we know
that either p /∈ Γ, or p /∈ ∆—granting the well-definedness of v.
• If ϕ = ¬p, then if ¬p ∈ Γ, we know that p /∈ Γ by the remarks above and, thus,
v(p) = f by definition of v. Whence, v(¬p) = t. Otherwise, if ¬p ∈ ∆, we know
that p /∈ ∆ by the remarks above and, thus, v(p) = t by definition. Whence,
v(¬p) = f . Notice that, by the remarks above, we know that either ¬p /∈ Γ, or
¬p /∈ ∆—granting the well-definedness of v.
Inductive step: we assume that for all formulae of lesser complexity than ϕ, the
hypothesis holds and show that it also holds for ϕ.
• If ϕ = ψ ∧ χ, then if ψ ∧ χ ∈ Γ we know that ψ, χ ∈ Γ. By the IH we know
that v(ψ) = v(χ) = t. Thus, v(ψ ∧ χ) = t. Otherwise, if ψ ∧ χ ∈ ∆, then either
ψ ∈ ∆ or χ ∈ ∆. By the IH we know that either v(ψ) = f or v(χ) = f . Whence,
v(ψ ∧ χ) = f .
• If ϕ = ψ∨χ, then if ψ∨χ ∈ Γ we know that either ψ ∈ Γ or χ ∈ Γ. By the IH we
knoww that either v(ψ) = t or v(χ) = t. Whence, v(ψ ∨ χ) = t. Otherwise, if
ψ∨χ ∈ ∆, we know that ψ, χ ∈ ∆. By the IH this implies that v(ψ) = v(χ) = f .
Whence, v(ψ ∨ χ) = f .
• If ϕ = ¬¬ψ, then if ¬¬ψ ∈ Γ we know that ψ ∈ Γ. By the IH we know that
v(ψ) = t, whence v(¬¬ψ) = t. Otherwise, if ¬¬ψ ∈ ∆ we know that ψ ∈ ∆.
By the IH we know that v(ψ) = f , whence v(¬¬ψ) = f .
12Notice, furthermore, that by simple reasoning these facts can be generalized to apply to
arbitrary formulae ϕ and not only to propositional variables and negated literals.
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• If ϕ = ¬(ψ∧χ), then if ¬(ψ∧χ) ∈ Γ we know that either ¬ψ ∈ Γ or ¬χ ∈ Γ. By
the IH we know that either v(¬ψ) = t or v(¬χ) = t, which implies that either
v(ψ) = f or v(χ) = f . Whence, v(ψ ∧ χ) = f and furthermore v(¬(ψ ∧ χ)) = t.
Otherwise, if ¬(ψ ∧ χ) ∈ ∆, we know that ¬ψ,¬χ ∈ ∆. By the IH this implies
that v(¬ψ) = v(¬χ) = f , which further implies that v(ψ) = v(χ) = t. Whence,
v(ψ ∧ χ) = t and furthermore v(¬(ψ ∧ χ)) = f .
• If ϕ = ¬(ψ ∨ χ), then if ¬(ψ ∨ χ) ∈ Γ we know that ¬ψ,¬χ ∈ Γ. By the IH
we know that v(¬ψ) = v(¬χ) = t, which implies that v(ψ) = v(χ) = f . Thus,
v(ψ ∨ χ) = f , whence v(¬(ψ ∨ χ)) = t. Otherwise, if ¬(ψ ∨ χ) ∈ ∆, then either
¬ψ ∈ ∆ or ¬χ ∈ ∆. By the IH we know that either v(¬ψ) = f or v(¬χ) = f ,
which implies that either v(ψ) = t, or v(χ) = t. Whence, v(ψ ∨ χ) = t and
furthermore v(¬(ψ ∨ χ)) = f .
Given this, and since {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ Γ and {ψ1, . . . , ψm} ⊆ ∆, we know
that for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v(ϕi) = t, and for all j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
v(ψj) = f . Whence, by looking at the Boolean reduct of the FP algebra it is
easy to notice that v(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) = t and v(ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm) = f . Therefore, v
is a PAIfde-valuation witnessing the fact that ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn 2PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ψm.
This establishes that if ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ψm, then a sequent of the
form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm is provable in G−PAIfde .
Finally, since G−PAIfde and GPAIfde are equivalent due to Lemma 4.6 (proven in
the Appendix) the above establishes that if ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm,
then a sequent of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm is provable in GPAIfde .
Corollary 4.8 (Cut-elimination). The Cut rule is eliminable from GPAIfde
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, if there is a proof of the sequent ϕ1, . . . , ϕnψ1, . . . , ψm
in GPAIfde , then ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn PAIfde ψ1∨· · ·∨ψm. Furthermore, by Theorem 4.7,
if ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn PAIfde ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm, then applying the method of reduction
trees gives a proof of the sequent ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm in GPAIfde . However,
notice that this proof does not feature any instance of the Cut rule and is, thus,
a Cut-free proof. Whence, for any sequent provable in GPAIfde , there is a proof
of it that does not use the Cut rule.
To close this section, we provide an answer to an inquiry by an anonymous
reviewer concerning the existence of a Deduction Theorem for our calculus. In
order to consider this issue, it should be taken into account beforehand that the
only available conditional connective that we have in our system is the material
conditional, definable as ϕ ⊃ ψ =def ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. For this connective, it can be
easily shown that the unrestricted or fully general Deduction Theorem does not
hold. To wit, consider the fact that the sequent q, pp is provable in our calculus
GPAIfde although the sequent q  p ⊃ p (alternatively read as q  ¬p ∨ p) is not
provable. However, this in itself suggests that a restricted form of this result
can be provided, as we prove below.
Observation 4.9. The following form of the Deduction Theorem holds for
GPAIfde :
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Γ, ϕ  ψ,∆ is provable ⇐⇒ Γ  ϕ ⊃ ψ,∆ is provable
where V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ).
Proof. For the left to right direction, assume that Γ, ϕψ,∆ is provable in GPAIfde .
Now, extend the proof of Γ, ϕψ,∆ with an application of the [¬R] rule to arrive
at the sequent Γ¬ϕ,ψ,∆, noting that such an application is legitimate because
V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ) is guaranteed by hypothesis. Then, extend such a proof with
an application of the [∨R] rule to arrive at the sequent Γ  ¬ϕ ∨ ψ,∆—which
given our remarks above is a definitional variant of the sequent Γ  ϕ ⊃ ψ,∆.
For the right to left direction, assume that Γ, ϕ  ψ,∆ is not provable in
GPAIfde . As above, let us assume that Γ can be redescribed as γ1, . . . , γn, and
that ∆ can be redescribed as δ1, . . . , δm. Then, by Theorem 4.7 (that is, by
completeness), we know that γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ ϕ 2PAIfde ψ ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm. This
implies that there is a PAIfde-valuation v such that v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧ ϕ) ∈ {t,o}
while v(ψ∨δ1∨· · ·∨δm) ∈ {e, f}. If v(γ1∧· · ·∧γn∧ϕ) = o, then by the operation
in the FP algebra we know that v(ϕ) = v(¬ϕ) = o, which given the previous
information would then imply that v(¬ϕ∨ψ∨δ1∨· · ·∨δm) = e. Thus, v would be
a PAIfde-valuation witnessing the fact that γ1∧· · ·∧γn 2PAIfde ¬ϕ∨ψ∨δ1∨· · ·∨δm.
Similarly, if v(γ1∧· · ·∧γn∧ϕ) = t, then by the operation in the FP algebra we
know that v(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn) = v(ϕ) = t. Then, if v(ψ ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm) = e, we are
guaranteed that v(¬ϕ∨ψ∨δ1∨· · ·∨δm) = e. Thus, v would be a PAIfde-valuation
witnessing the fact that γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn 2PAIfde ¬ϕ ∨ ψ ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm. If, on the
other hand, v(¬ϕ∨ψ∨ δ1∨· · ·∨ δm) = f , this would imply that v(ψ) = f . Since
by our assumption v(ϕ) = t, this implies that v(¬ϕ) = f . From this it follows
that v(¬ϕ∨ ψ) = f , which furthermore results in v(¬ϕ∨ ψ ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δm) = f .
Thus, v would be a PAIfde-valuation witnessing the fact that γ1∧ · · ·∧γn 2PAIfde
¬ϕ∨ψ∨δ1∨· · ·∨δm. In all of these cases, by Theorem 4.4 (that is, by soundness)
this implies that Γ  ¬ϕ ∨ ψ,∆ is not provable in GPAIfde , which by definition is
the same as saying that Γ  ϕ ⊃ ψ,∆ is not provable in our calculus.
Having provided a proof theory for PAIfde, in the next section we discuss
with more detail some aspects of the employed calculus, exploring its so-called
external consequence relation and offering some pointers towards potential gen-
eralizations for other similar logical systems.
5. Further remarks on the sequent calculus
The aim of this section is to comment on some aspects of the sequent calculus
for PAIfde presented above. To this extent, we divide it in two subsections. In
the first, we discuss the so-called external consequence relation of our calculus
GPAIfde . In the second, we reflect on the possibility of generalizing the techniques
applied in the previous section, in order to provide calculi for the Fmla-Fmla
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fragment that respects Parry’s Proscriptive Principle of other non-classical log-
ics.13
5.1. External Consequence
In [1, 2] and other works, A. Avron proposes to observe that it is possible to
associate to any given Gentzen-style sequent calculus GL at least a pair of con-
sequence relations. These are the so-called internal and external consequence
relations. In a nutshell, the internal consequence relation `I(GL) consists in the
relation holding between formulae within provable sequents. This is the usual
consequence relation associated with sequent calculi.
Definition 5.1. Given a Gentzen-style sequent calculus GL, its internal conse-
quence relation I(GL) is defined so that:
Γ `I(GL) ψ ⇐⇒ Γ  ψ is provable in GL
However, there is yet another option which is constituted by the external
consequence relation `E(GL). Briefly, this relation consists in adding formulae
as axioms to the sequent calculus, and determining which formulae we obtain
as theorems thereby. Thus, if we can prove the sequent ψ, when adding the
sequents in {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ} as axioms to GL, then we say that Γ entails ψ according
to `E(GL).
Definition 5.2. Given a Gentzen-style sequent calculus GL, its external conse-
quence relation E(GL) is defined so that:
Γ `E(GL) ψ ⇐⇒ ψ is provable in GL ∪ {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Γ}
Thus, one may wonder what the external consequence relation of our own
calculus GPAIfde is. In this respect, it shall be noted that although the notion of
external consequence is formulated in the Set-Fmla framework, we might as
well be interested in its restriction to the Fmla-Fmla framework. This may be
of special interest concerning sequent calculi GL for which provable sequents of
the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ψ1, . . . , ψm are interpreted as encoding validity claims of
the form ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn ` ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ψm in a logic L—such as in our own calculus
presented in the previous section. For cases of this sort, it may be interesting
to determine which is the logic corresponding to the Fmla-Fmla fragment of
the E(GPAIfde). In what follows, we devote to answering this question in what
pertains to our calculus.
As shown below, it can be straightforwardly noted that the Fmla-Fmla
fragment of E(GPAIfde)—the external consequence of our target calculus—is ex-
actly the Fmla-Fmla fragment of the consequence relation of CL[eo], that is
to say, the consequence relation associated to PAIfde.
Theorem 5.3. The Fmla-Fmla fragment of E(GPAIfde) = PAIfde.
13We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting me to consider the issues
in this section.
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Proof. Assume that ϕ entails ψ according to PAIfde, i.e., ϕ PAIfde ψ. Suppose,
now that ϕ is added as an axiom to GPAIfde . By Theorem 4.7 (that is, by com-
pleteness), the former implies that ϕψ is provable in GPAIfde . By an application
of the [Cut ] rule to the sequents ϕ and ϕ  ψ, we arrive at the sequent ψ,
thereby showing that ϕ entails ψ in E(GPAIfde), i.e., ϕ `E(GPAIfde ) ψ.
Assume that ϕ does not entail ψ according to PAIfde, i.e., ϕ 2PAIfde ψ. Sup-
pose, for reductio, that ϕ entails ψ in E(GPAIfde), i.e., ϕ `E(GPAIfde ) ψ. Now, this
implies that there is a proof in GPAIfde from ϕ to ψ, that is to say, a proof
whose topmost node is ϕ and whose last node is ψ. But, given this, we can
transform this proof into a proof of ϕψ. First, we add ϕ to the left-hand side
of each node of the proof, in compliance with the [KL] rule. Then, we extend
up the topmost node ϕϕ by routinely reducing it to one or several instances of
[Initial], in accordance with the reduction rules discussed in Section 4. Thus, we
end with a proof whose topmost nodes are instances of [Initial], and whose last
node is ϕψ. This will constitute a proof in GPAIfde of this last sequent. However,
by our assumption that ϕ 2PAIfde ψ in conjunction with Theorem 4.4 (that is,
soundness), we know that there is no proof of ϕψ in GPAIfde . This contradiction
allows us to infer that ϕ does not entail ψ in E(GPAIfde), i.e., ϕ 0E(GPAIfde ) ψ.
5.2. Some generalizations
An anonymous reviewer wonders whether it is possible to generalize the tech-
niques implemented to obtain GPAIfde in order to arrive at appropriate calculi
for the Fmla-Fmla fragment respecting Parry’s Proscriptive Principle of other
logics like, e.g., Intuitionistic Logic (IL, for short). We would like to point to-
wards an answer to this question, providing as many details as possible. To
understand what this would amount to, it is important to make a few remarks
first.
We present a calculus for PAIfde, and thus providing an intuitionistic analog
of our calculus would require entertaining an intuitionistic variant of PAIfde—
let us refer, in what follows, to such a logic as iPAIfde. Basically, this is the
restriction to the Fmla-Fmla framework of the fragment of Intuitionistic Logic
that respects the Proscriptive Principle, in our previous terminology, of ILPP.
In fewer words, then, the Fmla-Fmla fragment of ILPP = iPAIfde.
In order to present a calculus for iPAIfde, we need to consider that the usual
calculi for IL is usually presented in a very idiosyncratic fashion. To begin with,
it is usually presented as operating over sequents of the form Γ∆, understood
as pairs 〈Γ,∆〉 where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of formulae, and ∆ can
have at most one occurrence of one formula—thus, in contrast with our own
calculus, ∆ can be either empty or a singleton of the form {χ}. Moreover, it is
usually presented using purely additive, i.e., context-sharing rules—whereas our
calculus is presented through some rules which are additive and some which are
multiplicative, i.e., context-independent. Furthermore, precisely because of the
cardinality restrictions over the right-hand side of the sequents, the admissible
form of the Weakening Right rule cannot be absorbed in the axioms in any way
and has therefore to be separately stated—contrary to the case of our calculus.
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Thus, all these changes need to be made in transitioning from our calculus GPAIfde
for PAIfde, to a calculus which we may call GiPAIfde for the intuitionistic variant
iPAIfde.
In this regard, we conjecture that the set of rules appearing below provides
an adequate calculus for this logic, although for matters of space we cannot go
through the details of the corresponding soundness and completeness proofs,
for they would take us too far afield. As regards the system iPAIfde, let us
notice in passing that no semantics have been offered for it, and that it has
not been studied in complete detail, apart from the discussion of its implication
fragment by T. Ferguson in [19]. In connection to this, below we will represent
intuitionistic implication with the binary connective →.14
Definition 5.4. The calculus GiPAIfde is constituted by the following rules:
Initial Sequents:
[Initial] Γ, p  p
Structural Rules:
Γ, ϕ, ϕ  χ
Γ, ϕ  χ [WL] Γ Γ  ψ [KR]† Γ, ϕ  χ Γ  ϕΓ  χ [Cut ]
† : where V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(Γ)
Operational Rules:
Γ  ϕ
Γ,¬ϕ [¬L] Γ, ϕ Γ  ¬ϕ [¬R]‡
‡ : where V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ)
Γ, ϕ  χ Γ, ψ  χ
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ  χ [∨L] Γ  ϕΓ  ϕ ∨ ψ [∨R]† Γ  ψΓ  ϕ ∨ ψ [∨R]‡
† : where V ar(ψ) ⊆ V ar(Γ) ‡ : where V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ)
Γ, ϕ  χ
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ  χ [∧L] Γ, ψ  χΓ, ϕ ∧ ψ  χ [∧L] Γ  ϕ Γ  ψΓ  ϕ ∧ ψ [∧R]
Γ  ϕ Γ, ψ  χ
Γ, ϕ→ ψ  χ [→L] Γ, ϕ  ψΓ  ϕ→ ψ [→R]‡
‡ : where V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(Γ)
14For matters of space, we do not discuss the De Morgan rules, although some of them
are derivable in the present calculus. This being said, not all of them are, as some—like the
[¬¬L], [¬¬R], and [¬∧L] rules—are even inadmissible in Intuitionistic Logic.
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Notice that, just like in our calculus, some of the rules of GiPAIfde have linguis-
tic restrictions that guarantee the satisfaction of Parry’s Proscriptive Principle.
In the case of [¬R], this is apparent just like in our calculus, as it is in the case
of the [KR] rule, which cannot be absorbed in the axioms (like in our calculus),
due to the cardinality constraints proper of a calculus for IL. In fact, in the case
of the pair of [∨R], restrictions are present precisely because of such cardinality
constraints, and the fact that rules are presented in an additive manner. Similar
remarks apply to other rules.
This being said, we believe that similar strategies could be applied to obtain
appropriate fragments, of other logics, where these fragments also satisfy the
Proscriptive Principle. For instance, substructural logics could be explored in
this respect, thereby studying fragments of this sort of, e.g., Linear, Affine Logic,
and more. We hope to study these systems in future research soon.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we presented semantics for PAIfde of a type unlike that of previous
discussions concerning this logic. In fact, while previous characterizations of
this logic have been done using intensional semantics, or extensional semantics
of an algebraic kind, we have shown that it is possible to analyze the target
notion of entailment using the tools of logical matrices—understanding logical
consequence as necessary preservation of designated values. In the paragraphs
above, we presented a calculus for PAIfde that follows the path of working with
rules (either structural or operational) that are subject to linguistic restrictions,
guaranteeing the preservation of the relevant property characteristic of Parry’s
logic: the Proscriptive Principle.
A lot of avenues of further research open up exactly where this article lefts
off—especially regarding the semantic techniques developed here. One of these
concerns the potential to generalize the techniques implemented to work with
PAIfde, in order to characterize different relevant logics complying with principles
other than Parry’s. In this vein, one may look at what is called the dual of
Parry’s Proscriptive Principle in, e.g., [12] and [45], which requires that for a
first-degree entailment of the form ϕ → ψ, it holds that V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ).
A system whose valid implications comply with this principle is R. Epstein’s
Dual Dependence logic (hereafter, DD), regarding which it can be said—per the
analysis of, e.g., F. Paoli in [31] that:
`DD ϕ→ ψ ⇐⇒
{
ϕ `CL ψ, and
V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(ψ)
Then, letting LdPP be defined, for any given logic, in an analogous way to how
LPP is defined above—noting that DDfde = the Fmla-Fmla fragment of CLdPP.
Whence, one may wonder whether it is possible to apply the techniques
above to provide matrix semantics and Gentzen-style sequent calculi not only
for DDfde, but for (the Fmla-Fmla fragment of) LdPP, for any given logic L.
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Following the previous remarks, we conjecture that the answer is affirmative. In
fact, regarding the general semantic result in Theorem 3.10, all that would be
needed is to change, respectively, the requirement that the infectious value u is
undesignated for the requirement that it be designated, and vice-versa with the
“mimicking” value j. Concerning a calculus for DDfde, then, it would suffice to
consider a proper dualization of the linguistic constraints imposed on [Initial]
and the left and right rules for negation.15
Finally, alongside these issues, there is the question of how may all these
discussions generalize to the first-order case. We briefly point out that, in this
regard, we agree with K. Fine in [21] and R. French in [24] that an appropriate
generalization of the notion of subject-matter of a formula ϕ—formalized in an
ideal way in the context of propositional languages as V ar(ϕ)—should render
the subject-matter of ∀xϕ(x) as being equal to that of the sum or collection of
all instances of ϕ(x). We leave the matter of how to best deal with these issues
for future investigations, hoping to discuss them in the near future.
Appendix: Equivalence of G−PAIfde and GPAIfde
The following proof of our Lemma 4.6 is a straightforward adaptation of R.
French’s proof of his Lemma 3.9 in [24], for an analogous fact regarding a further
restricted form of his calculus GAC for Angell’s logic of Analytic Containment—
where the Γ and ∆ featured in the initial sequents can also only be sets of
literals.16 Finally, for the proof below to go through it is necessary to consider
the following definition of complexity.
Definition 6.1 ([24]). Given a formula ϕ, let the De Morgan Complexity
dmc(ϕ) be defined as follows:
• dmc(p) = 0
• dmc(¬p) = 0
• dmc(ϕ ∧ ψ) = dmc(¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)) = 1 + dmc(ϕ) + dmc(ψ)
15Therefore, letting these rules be of the following form:
[Initial] Γ, p  p,∆ where V ar(Γ, p) ⊆ V ar(∆, p)
Γ  ϕ,∆
Γ,¬ϕ  ∆ [¬L]‡ Γ, ϕ  ∆Γ  ¬ϕ,∆ [¬R]†
‡ : where V ar(ϕ) ⊆ V ar(∆) † : where Γ 6= ∅
16The only modification needed for his argument to apply to our case lies in replacing the
mention of t(A) and t(Γ) in the proof of the aforementioned theorem, respectively, for V ar(ϕ)
and V ar(Γ).
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• dmc(ϕ ∨ ψ) = dmc(¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)) = 1 + dmc(ϕ) + dmc(ψ)
• dmc(¬¬ϕ) = 1 + dmc(ϕ)
Proof of Lemma 4.6. First, since all instances of [LiteralInitial] are instances
of [Initial], it readily follows that if a sequent is derivable in G−PAIfde , it is also
derivable in GPAIfde . Secondly, to show that if a sequent is derivable in GPAIfde , it
is also derivable in G−PAIfde we suppose we have a proof starting with an instance
of [Initial] of the following form, where V ar(∆, p) ⊆ V ar(Γ, p):
Γ, p  p,∆
which is not an instance of [LiteralInitial], meaning that Γ,∆ * Lit. We then
show how to transform said proof in a G−PAIfde proof. For this purpose, we show
how Γ and ∆ can each be legitimately replaced by a set of literals. We do this
first for ∆, and then for Γ.
To show that ∆ can be replaced by a set of literals, we perform an induction
on the sum of the De Morgan complexities of the formulae in ∆. If such a sum
is 0, then every formula in ∆ is a literal, as needed. If such a sum is positive
and less or equal than n, then we assume that the instance of [Initial] that our
GPAIfde proof starts off with is of one of the following forms (with the rest of the
cases being strictly analogous to these):
(i) Γ, p  p,∆, ϕ ∨ ψ (ii) Γ, p  p,∆, ϕ ∧ ψ (iii) Γ, p  p,∆,¬¬ϕ
noticing that, in all the cases above, the sum of De Morgan complexities of the
right-hand side of each sequent is n + 1. We proceed to show how, in each
case, we can derive each of these instances of [Initial] from instances whose
right-hand side is of lower De Morgan complexity, as follows:
(i)
Γ, p  p,∆, ϕ, ψ
Γ, p  p,∆, ϕ ∨ ψ (ii) Γ, p  p,∆, ϕ Γ, p  p,∆, ψΓ, p  p,∆, ϕ ∧ ψ (iii) Γ, p  p,∆, ϕΓ, p  p,∆,¬¬ϕ
Thus, given that in each of these cases the premise-sequents have right-hand
sides of at least one lower De Morgan complexity, by the IH we know that they
can be derived from instances of [Initial] where ∆ contains only literals. From
this it follows that we can replace all instances of [Initial] with instances of the
following sequent schema, letting p±1 , . . . , p
±
m be literals:
Γ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m where V ar(p±1 , . . . , p±m, p) ⊆ V ar(Γ, p)
To show that Γ can be replaced by a set of literals, we perform once again
an induction on the sum of the De Morgan complexities of the formulae in Γ. If
such a sum is 0, then every formula in Γ is a literal, as needed. If such a sum is
positive and less or equal than n, then we assume that the instance of [Initial]
that our GPAIfde proof starts off with is of one of the following forms (with the
rest of the cases being strictly analogous to these):
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(i′) Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ, p  p,∆ (ii′) Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ, p  p,∆ (iii′) Γ,¬¬ϕ, p  p,∆
noticing that, in all the cases above, the sum of De Morgan complexities of the
left-hand side of each sequent is n+ 1. We proceed to show how, in each case,
we can derive each of these instances of [Initial] from instances whose left-hand
side is of lower De Morgan complexity, as follows:
(i′)
Γ, ϕ, ψ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m
(ii′)
Γ, ϕ, p  p, r±1 , . . . , r±k
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ,ϕ, p  p, r±1 , . . . , r±k [KL]
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ,ϕ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m [KR]
Γ, ϕ, p  p, s±1 , . . . , s±j
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ,ψ, p  p, s±1 , . . . , s±j [KL]
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ,ψ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m [KR]
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ,ϕ ∨ ψ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m [∨L]
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m [WL]
where {r±1 , . . . , r±k } = {p±i ∈ {p±1 , . . . , p±m} | V ar(p±i ) ∈ V ar(Γ, ϕ)} and simi-
larly {s±1 , . . . , s±j } = {p±i ∈ {p±1 , . . . , p±m} | V ar(p±i ) ∈ V ar(Γ, ψ)}.
(iii′)
Γ, ϕ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m
Γ,¬¬ϕ, p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m
Thus, given that in each of these cases the premise-sequents have left-hand
sides of at least one lower De Morgan complexity, by the IH we know that they
can be derived from instances of [Initial] where Γ contains only literals. From
this it follows that we can replace all instances of [Initial] with instances of the
following sequent schema, letting q±1 , . . . , q
±
n , p
±
1 , . . . , p
±
m be literals:
q±1 , . . . , q
±
n , p  p, p±1 , . . . , p±m where V ar(p±1 , . . . , p±m, p) ⊆ V ar(q±1 , . . . , q±n , p)
This concludes showing how a GPAIfde proof can be turned into a G−PAIfde proof.
Therefore, if a sequent is derivable in GPAIfde , then it is derivable in G−PAIfde .
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